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Over the past two decades, controversy has raged over the Vatican edict to canonize 
Pius XII, the pope whose reign coincided with the Second World War and the Holocaust. 
Debates over his wartime conduct perdured despite the want of ecclesiastical sources. Until 
the turn of the century, historians had been slow to research the role of the Vatican in the 
Holocaust, but now they come with determination.1 Grating on Catholic sensitivities, the 
topic has become a centerpiece of historical scrutiny. This paper explores and explains the 
response of the Catholic Church to Nazi racial persecution of Jews.2 For a fair and thorough 
appraisal, it is essential to chart—and give a sense of chronology to—the history of Vatican 
diplomacy with the Third Reich. Just as key is to use some evaluative criteria on the Church 
based on its pyramidal structure. This paper centers its gravity of analysis on the Vatican’s 
                                                          
1
 To be sure, there had been excellent literature that interrogates the wartime conduct of the Church.  In the 
1960s Guenter Lewy and Saul Friedländer supplied between themselves important early perspectives that 
continue to shape today’s conversation. But the catalyst for later interest came as the Vatican prepared to ordain 
its own verdict on its role in the Holocaust, or Shoah. Amid expectancy for contrition and apology, in 1998 the 
Vatican published a brief requiem, “We Remember: A Reflection on Shoah.” Essentially a self-exculpatory 
instrument, it drew an avalanche of criticisms from Jewish and Catholic circles. Quickly, library shelves began 
to serve up titles that confronted the role of the Church in relation to Nazi Germany. In addition to strictly 
historical accounts of the Vatican’s role in the Holocaust, there also has been attention from journalists and 
political scientists. See, for instance, British journalist John Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope (Viking Adult, 1999), a 
work of popular history that is still Exhibit A in the discourse of Vatican Holocaust blame. See also A Moral 
Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair, (Alfred Knopf, 
New York, 2002), by Harvard political scientist Daniel Goldhagen. This genre of literature is marked by efforts 
to re-curate the history of Vatican vis-à-vis Hitler’s racial war against European Jewry. Armed with critical—
which means fair—and non-hagiographical assessments of Pius XII, they rebut Church apologists who have 
spoken with a political or religious agenda.  
2
 Here, “Nazi persecution of Jews” refers not only to industrialized mass murder, but also the underlying racial 
politics that made it possible. As such, this paper looks beyond Rome in the spatial sense and before the Final 
Solution chronologically. In regards to sources, this complex historical question cannot be comprehensively 
addressed without eyeing the wartime archives of the Vatican, which would clarify the decision-making 
processes of the Church hierarchy. However, given that for decades the Vatican has refused to make accessible 
its key wartime archives, this paper makes heavy use of historiography in addition to primary sources to 
synthesize a view of its own. 
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institutional response to Hilter’s “Final Solution to the Jewish Question.”3 But more than sit 
in judgment on the Church, it seeks to understand and explain its conduct.4  
The historiographical debate shares one important concord. Most historians of repute 
argue that, in regards to the Final Solution, the Church hierarchy tolerated or emboldened the 
Hitler regime with considerable diplomatic and moral impunity. Although some Church 
defenders protest by citing private papal beneficence towards Jews, the consensus in 
professional discourse is that the papacy remained voiceless.5 Broadly speaking, the canons 
of scholarship can be divided into three camps. There are, on the one hand, church or papal 
apologists who are fundamentally closed to a secular, pluralist view of history. Such people 
do little more than pronounce the rectitude of the Church. They generally dismiss criticisms 
of Pius XII as symptoms of anti-Catholicism.6 In diametric opposition, inquisitors of the 
Church pummel the Supreme Pontiff for his putative anti-Semitism. Finally, there are those 
who undertake the project of historia in the spirit of intellectual honesty. It is the last act to 
which this paper aspires.7  
                                                          
3
 In making references to general facts and their interpretations, this paper builds extensively on the work of the 
esteemed Catholic historian Guenter Lewy, but also spotlights the Vatican position, which is explicated in 
Michael Phayer’s The Catholic Church and the Holocaust and Hubert Wolf’s Pope and Devil; The Vatican’s 
Archives and the Third Reich. In particular, Wolf’s collection of letters sent by the Jewish-turned-Catholic Edith 
Stein to His Holiness illuminates early Vatican perspective toward anti-Semitism in Germany. For the actual 
letters and their translations, see Hubert Wolf, Pope and Devil, The Vatican’s Archives and the Third Reich, 
trans. Kenneth Kronenberg, (Harvard University Press, 2010), 185-189. 
4
 To explain is not to exculpate. But a complete understanding of history remains impossible unless the link 
between causality and effect is understood. 
5
 Neither the Catholic Church nor church apologists have been able to point to a papal speech, oral or in writing, 
in which Pius XII condemned Nazism or anti-Semitism by name. While they try to exculpate him in other 
ways—such as decorating his wan and glancing statements as ringing denunciations—it is a matter of 
established historical understanding that there is no record of public papal condemnation of Nazism. 
6
 One of these persons is Father Peter Gumpel, the Vatican relator tasked with curating the history of wartime 
Vatican and with advancing the cause for Pius XII’s canonization. Father Gumpel has lashed out at John 
Cornwell, author of Hitler’s Pope, describing him as “a rank amateur in the field of history, canon law, etc., has 
produced a shoddy, superficial and totally untrustworthy book which, to say the very least, is objectively biased, 
tendentious and so unilateral and one-sided that one wonders what really prompted this man to write this book.” 
Quoted in Peter Gumpel, “Hitler’s Pope: A Nasty Caricature of A Noble and Saintly Man,” in A Zenit Daily 
Dispatch http://www.ewtn.com/library/issues/zpius12a.htm (Accessed September 13, 2014). 
7
 Although judiciousness is the aim, it is the author’s view that that historical analysis cannot be strictly 
partitioned from historical judgment. Against those who think historians cannot judge—or that the Catholic 
Church cannot be judged—this paper attempts to broach a rapprochement between dispassionate historical 
analysis and historical judgment of the kind that is necessarily subjective but assuredly not relativistic. 
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Since John Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope reinvigorated public interest in 1999, the locus 
of the historical debate has shifted over time. In the main, Vatican wartime conduct has been 
analyzed in three ways. Personality-based narratives, such as Cornwell’s papal profile, give 
primacy to the personality of the pontiff in the modus operandi of Vatican diplomacy. 
Depicting him as an autocrat, they tend the view Pius XII as the Catholic Church. More 
commonly appreciated are theories of contingency that explain the reserve of the Church in 
the language of realpolitik.8 But, citing the Church’s very own anti-Semitic legacies, those 
anchoring for a diachronic view of history impress logical entailment over contingency to 
explain its reticence.9  
Upon close reading of important sources, this paper first establishes the complicity of 
the Catholic Church in Nazi persecution of Jews. For the Church to be complicit, it would 
have to mean that i) the Church had—whether or not it meant to have—intelligence of 
industrialized mass murder of Jews and failed to treat it with attentiveness; ii) the Church 
hierarchy, with pope at the helm, acquiesced or assented to the genocide when it had the 
capacity to intervene and save lives; iii) as the self-crowned only true bulwark against evil, 
the Church conducted itself in manners incommensurate with an institution of higher calling. 
To speak of the complicity of the Church is not to condemn all Catholics, nor does the 
indictment imply a charge of collective guilt against the implicating Church personnel. To be 
sure, beyond the confines of the Holy See, some lower levels of Catholic clergy tried, with 
varying degrees of success, to aid their local Jews. At the apex of the Church hierarchy, Pius 
                                                          
8
 Proponents of this view provide a dizzying array of reasons to explain the silence of the pontiff. According to 
these accounts, Pius XII was leery of Bolshevism, keen to safeguard the rights of Catholics in Europe, bent on 
preserving Vatican neutrality in the midst of war, or even wary of his personal safety. It is therefore often 
assumed that anti-Semitism, if it existed in the Vatican hierarchy, was an appendage to the affair. 
9
 Of late—particularly after the obfuscations the Church made in “We Remember”—a growing body of 
literature has come to view the Holocaust as the culminating point of Christian anti-Semitism over time. For 
thorough expositions on the history of Vatican anti-Semitism—and the ways in which it laid the groundwork for 
the Holocaust—see two international bestsellers: David Kertzer, The Popes Against the Jews, (Alfred Knopf, 
2001) and James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword, (Mariner Books, 2002). One caveat: neither author argues for a 
deterministic, teleological view of history that impresses on the inevitability of the Holocaust. Rather, the 
message is that Nazi racial anti-Semitism grew out of the consecrated religious anti-Semitism of the Church, of 
which the Crusades and the Inquisition had been logical outgrowths. 
3
Li: Capitulation or Resistance? The Response of the Catholic Church t
Published by Open Works, 2015
  
XII did voice concern for Jewish converts to Catholicism in specific instances. But these 
qualifications, hardly redemptive, do not alter the overall drift of the historical verdict. More 
than a few Vatican bureaucrats, the Catholic Church was a pan-European agglomeration of 
peoples and institutions that, in numerous instances of the Nazi exterminationist era, behaved 
badly towards Jews. 
The Church assumed complicity just as Nazism took root. It all began when Cardinal 
Eugenio Pacelli, the would-be Pius XII, negotiated for the Vatican an international treaty 
with Hilter’s fledgling regime. Consummated in the seemingly innocuous circumstances of 
July 1933, Reichskonkordat represented Nazism’s first diplomatic triumph. Despite the well-
publicized savagery of Nazism, the Concordat made the world sit up and take notice: the 
moral hub of Christian Europe was now its official partner. Within Germany, the Concordat 
broke the backbone of Catholic resistance: In exchange for such concessions as the unfettered 
control in the schooling of Catholic children, the Church agreed to dissolve the Catholic 
Center Party and to withdraw its clergy from German political affairs.10 
To be sure, a vote for Nazism in 1933 was not a vote for the Final Solution.  Back 
then, neither Pacelli nor the Church hierarchy could have fully discerned the malevolence of 
Hitler’s ambitions. But the Concordat was a recipe for disaster. By consigning the Center 
Party to oblivion the Rome-Berlin pact cleared the way for Hitler’s rise to total power. It 
demoralized German Catholics who might have dissented.11 It legitimized the regime in the 
eyes of the world.12 It sealed a sorry preface to what was about to come. Indeed, there were 
immediate clues—cues, in fact—that should have put the Church on red alert. In the 
aftermath of scoring his first diplomatic victory as Chancellor of the Third Reich, Hitler made 
the chilling declaration during his cabinet meeting that the Concordat “created an atmosphere 
                                                          
10
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 91-92. 
11
 Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 139 & 149 & 218. 
12
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 90.  
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of confidence that would be significant in the urgent struggle against International Jewry.”13 
Here was an opportunity to discredit Hitler, and to awaken those deceived by him. Instead, 
the subtext of Hitler’s speech went under the radar of the Church. 
But there would be more, and worse. Taking the papal throne in March 1939, Eugenio 
Pacelli, now Pius XII, helped turn a new page in the foul history of Nazi-Vatican 
collaboration. Prior to Pacelli’s accession, the papacy occupied by Pius XI had begun to 
express its misgivings about Nazism. The ailing but headstrong Pius XI first complained in 
his March 1937 encyclical Mit brennender Sorge (“With Burning Anxiety”) of Nazi 
violations of Reichskonkordat.14 In May of the following year, he snubbed Hitler’s first visit 
to Rome by relieving himself out of town.15 A month later, the pontiff commissioned a further 
encyclical, Humani Generis Unitas (“The Unity of Humankind”), to decry Nazi racism.16 But 
such was the cruel irony of history that, shortly after he died of heart attack in February 1939, 
the new pontiff shredded the encyclical.17 Reversing Vatican’s position, upon his inauguration 
Pacelli paid personal homage to an all-powerful Hilter, crafting the following message, 
To the Illustrious Herr Adolf Hilter! Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich! 
Here at the beginning of Our Pontificate We wish to assure you that We remain 
devoted to the spiritual welfare of the German people entrusted to your leadership… 
During the many years we spent in Germany, We did all in Our power to establish 
harmonious relations between Church and State. Now that the responsibilities of Our 
pastoral function have increased Our opportunities, how much more ardently do We 
pray to reach that goal. May the prosperity of the German people and their progress in 
every domain come, with God’s help, to fruition!18 
A Germanophile,19 Pacelli demonstrated throughout the course of the Final Solution 
his lassitude to the paroxysms of the Third Reich. Upon being urged by Myron C. Taylor, 
                                                          
13
 Quoted in Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 152. 
14
 Daniel Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning: The Catholic Church In the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of 
Repair (Alfred Knopf, 2002), 46. 
15
 Michael Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, (Indiana University Press, 2002), 2. 
16
 Ibid., 4. 
17
 Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, Preface to the 2008 Edition, xvii. 
18
 Quoted in Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 208. 
19
 Prior to his rise to Cardinalship Pacelli had served in Germany as papal nuncio from 1917 to 1929. In his 
papal reign he appointed an entourage of German advisers, exciting them with his knowledge of German 
language and culture. See Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 55. 
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President Roosevelt’s envoy to the Vatican, to speak out against the murder of the Jews in the 
Polish death factories in July 1942, he led the Holy See in shirking this moral imperative by 
casting doubt on the veracity of the genocidal campaign.20 Among Pacelli’s most ignominious 
silences was his refusal to heed the efforts of Bishop Konrad Preysing of Germany, who 
pressed him to intervene on thirteen occasions in fifteen months during the years of 1943 and 
1944.21 Even as the Nazi death squads threatened to round up the 8,000 Jews in Rome in the 
fall of 1943, the man in the Eternal City refused to protest.22 To the 1,000 Roman Jews 
deported to concentration camps and whose fate one dares not speculate, Pacelli owed moral 
accountability for his detached silence.23 
The Catholic Church prides itself as a moral institution. As Nazism threw Europe into 
moral abyss, what could possibly have dissuaded Pius XII from denouncing industrialized 
mass murder? It has been suggested that the pontiff wished to keep the Vatican from aerial 
bombing,24 that he balked at the spectre of papal assassination,25 that he feared for the safety 
of Catholics, 26  and that his enmity for communism clouded this judgment. 27  Even the 
constraints of geography have been brought forth on his behalf. 28  These imputed 
considerations might well have played into Pius XII’s thinking, but they are not good 
advertisements for the moral properties of the Catholic Church. And as we shall see, the 
primary explanation—at least for the inactivity of the Church—lay elsewhere. 
                                                          
20
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 298. See also, Phayer, 49. 
21
 Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 81. 
22
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 300-301. For thorough treatment of Pius’ reticence in Nazi 
round-up of Roman Jews, see Susan Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and The Holocaust In 
Italy, (Yale University Press, 2002). Through painstaking research of local archives, Zuccotti, a professor of 
history at Columbia University, has studied the ways in which the Vatican responded to Nazi rounding up of 
Jews in Rome, under the nose of Pius XII. 
23
 Of the 1,000 Romans Jews deported, fourteen men and one woman returned alive; the rest were killed at 
Auschwitz. See Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 301. 
24
 Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 43 
25
 This argument is advanced by Dan Kurzman, A Special Mission: Hitler’s Secret Plot to Seize the Vatican and 
Kidnap Pope Pius XII, (Da Capo Press, 2007). 
26
 Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows, 313. 
27
 Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 19. See also Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows, 314. 
28
 Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows, 318. Zuccotti writes, “Unlike parish priests who dealt with human frailty 
every day, the pope was sheltered not rom political and diplomatic maneuvering but from unpleasant realities of 
cruelty and suffering. He lived in an unreal world.” 
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 Without the issuance of condemnation, could it not have been the case that the pontiff 
wished to secretly shelter Jews from Nazi seizure? The legend of papal beneficence has 
gained purchase, post-Holocaust. The mythos have it that, with Nazi death squads closing in 
on Rome, Pius XII turned Rome’s churches and monasteries into places of sanctuary. For 
some time, the historicity of papal beneficence was taken for granted.29 But in her magnificent 
study of the Holocaust in Italy, Susan Zuccotti demonstrates that gratitude toward Pius 
himself—including that from surviving Jews—was misplaced.30 According to Zuccotti, a 
great number of Roman Jews were saved, but evidence of a papal initiative was sketchy.31 
The Vatican statesman neither approved nor encouraged clandestine Catholic rescuing of 
Jews. Instead, prelates who sanctuarized Jews in their private residences were admonished to 
“use prudence and moderation.”32 Thus, while the transgressions of Nazism failed to furrow 
his censorious brows, Pacelli did make his displeasure known to those who put their lives on 
the line to save Jews. 
In reply to criticisms of papal reticence, church apologists cite Pacelli’s 1942 
Christmas address as one occasion where he did speak out against the Nazis. They claim, in 
addition, such was the exquisiteness of his denunciation that the Nazis took aim at the Church. 
Yet, reading between the lines of Pacelli’s speech—altogether no less than 6,900 words when 
translated into English—is to shiver at the caginess with which the pontiff addressed the 
upheaval of his time. Pacelli barely gave mention to the attempted destruction of European 
Jewry, which had already been in full swing since January 1942, and which he knew all 
                                                          
29
 Papal apologists cling to this conforming narrative, citing that postwar, Jewish leaders worldwide thanked 
Pius XII for what he personally did to save Jews of Europe. Even Lewy acknowledges the pontiff’s personal 
role in saving Roman Jews in his The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 301. But Zuccotti says Jewish 
gratitude was “rooted in benevolent ignorance.” Given the perceived need to uproot anti-Semitism and to 
improve the fragility of Jewish-Catholic relationship, Pius XII was symbolically thanked—“Distinctions may 
have seemed petty.” See Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows, 301-303. 
30
 Ibid., 
31
 Ibid., 301. 
32
 Ibid., 307. 
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along.33 Where he did imply the gravity of the situation, he buried his words in a sea of 
verbosity. Nearing the very end of his long broadcast, Pacelli addressed the world as such, 
Mankind owes that vow to the hundreds of thousands of persons who, without any 
fault on their part, sometimes only because of their nationality or race [stirpe], have 
been consigned to death or to a slow decline.34 
By the time of his papal circumlocution, Pacelli had already been apprised of the irrefutable 
nature and scale of the Final Solution. Thus, speaking of “hundreds of thousands of persons” 
being “consigned to a slow decline” not only failed as utterances of moral denunciations, it 
could have also misinformed his audience, many of whom were less privy to the scale of 
Hitler’s racial culling. Throughout his speech Pacelli did not name either Jews, anti-Semitism, 
genocide or even the Nazis.35 Indeed, this would remain the fullest extent of his protest. 
Observing Pacelli’s sin of omission, one cannot say with certainty that had he issued a 
flaming protest, or threatened Hitler, a baptized Catholic, with excommunication, the fate of 
European Jewry could have been overturned. It would be just as uncertain whether 23 million 
German Catholic faithful—or those 22% confessing Catholics in the army—might have 
suffered a conflict of allegiances, had Rome gone head-on with the German state. But one 
needs not derive the assurance of certainty to such questions. To say the pontiff’s inaction or 
passivity was a failure of nerve in decision-making is a masterpiece of understatement. His 
                                                          
33
 Vatican officials—with a communication network second perhaps only to the Soviet Union—were among the 
first to learn about Nazi genocides, which began with Einsatzgruppen, or mobile killing units, massacring 
Eastern European Jews, before the death chambers of the Auschwitzs did the job with greater secrecy and 
efficiency. See Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 41-42.  
34
 Pius XII, The Internal Order of States and People, Christmas message, 1942. 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/p12ch42.htm 
There are many versions of translations of Pacelli’s Christmas address, which is not available in English on the 
Vatican’s website. This excerpt was taken from Global Catholic Network, or EWTN, which published Pacelli’s 
entire speech. One word in the excerpt merits especial attention. The Italian word “stirpe” has been more 
commonly translated by scholars as “descent,” rather than “race,” as EWTN did on its website. The distinction 
this makes is such that, while many scholars claim that Pacelli did not speak of a racially motivated persecution, 
papal apologists affirm that Pacelli did denounce racism. 
35
 It is sometimes asserted that had a stronger statement of condemnation been made, Hitler would have killed 
more Jews as a matter of revenge. But this is patently false. There is no genocide in which the interests of the 
victims are better served by deliberately having the rest of the world not denounce it. Moreover, it cannot be 
plausibly demonstrated that papal non-intervention saved Jews. 
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Church, after all, possessed enormous wealth and international prestige, which could have 
been employed on purely humanitarian grounds.  
Yet, imporant as Pius XII was to the Catholic Church, he was not all of it. While 
Pacelli’s retreatism doomed the fate of European Jews, it was the de facto support of the 
Vatican that had ushered in the destruction of democracies and the empowerment of 
persecutionist regimes in Europe.36 Four years previous to concluding Reichskonkordat, the 
Vatican had struck a copycat agreement, known as the Lateran Treaty, with Mussolini’s Italy. 
Like it would to the Center Party in Germany, the Vatican ordered an end to Italy’s Catholic 
Popular Party.37 In his recent book on Italian fascism, David Kertzer has eviscerated the myth 
of Vatican resistance.38 To the contrary, argues Kertzer, the Vatican collaborated with II Duce 
(“The Leader,” referring to Mussolini) in the passage of Italian anti-Semitic racial laws of 
January 1939.39 
Many Catholic right-wing parties across the continent were also complicit in the 
spread of anti-Semitism. In France, Catholic organizations such as Charles Maurras’ Action 
Française headed an extreme right that was memorialized by the tag “Meilleur Hitler Que 
Blum.” 40 The slogan—“better a racist German dictator than a French socialist Jew”—formed 
the intellectual backbone of collaborationist Vichy, where such anti-Semites as Marshal 
Pétain and Pierre Laval would offer up French Jews for deportation and murder.41 In the heat 
of racial war, Catholic presses around Europe continued to engineer anti-Semitic canards, 
which maligned Jews as Christ-killers and as architects of Bolshevism, often in one breath.42 
In Eastern Europe, Catholic parties such as Hungary’s Arrow Cross and Slovakia’s Slovak 
                                                          
36
 Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning, 132, 138. 
37
 Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 114. 
38
 David Kertzer, The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and The Rise of Fascism in Europe, 
(Random House, 2014) 
39
 Ibid., 405. 
40
 Phayer, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 12 
41
 For discussions of Vichy collaboration with the Third Reich, see Robert Paxton’s classic study—Vichy 
France: Old Guard and New Order, (North Company, 1975) 
42
 Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning, 136-138. See also, Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 7-8. 
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People’s Party actively preached anti-Semitism.43 To cite just one more example, Stanislaw 
Trzeciak, a polish Catholic priest, hyped up The Protocols of the Elders of Zion even though 
it had been shown to be a forgery.44 In the midst of genocides, these and other offenses incur 
moral and political blame.  
But the most sinister complicity of the Church betrayed its role as a perpetrator. From 
the outset of racial persecutions, the Church willingly surrendered its genealogical records to 
the Nazis, enabling them to trace the extent of one’s Jewish ancestry.45 Despite knowledge of 
what the racial profiling of Jews entailed, the Church performed this task without fail, 
complaining only of inadequate remuneration for its services.46 It goes without saying that, 
like Vichy France, the Catholic Church was in these instances not just complicit but also 
culpable.  
It is through the provision of genealogical dossiers—and the circulation of Catholic 
anti-Semitic presses in fulcrums of the Holocaust—that the elephant in the room is finally 
revealed. The Catholic Church abandoned Jews to the Nazis not because its popes were 
cowardly, or its diplomacy selfish; these were tangential, if relevant at all. Contingency or 
realpolitik does not explain why highly placed German bishops made visible and risky 
protests against Nazi euthanasia programs from as early as 1934.47 It does not explain why 
they did so by way of saying the obvious: that murdering innocents offends the moral 
sensibility of Germans. 48  Nor does pusillanimity apply to the Church, a powerful, 
transnational institution that has historically adjudicated important political and moral 
                                                          
43
 Phayer, The Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 13-14. 
44
 Ibid., 8. 
45
 See Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 282. “The very question of whether the [Catholic] 
Church should lend its help to the Nazi state in sorting out people of Jewish descent was never debated. On the 
contrary, ‘We have always unselfishly worked for the people without regard to gratitude or ingratitude,’ a priest 
wrote in Klerusblatt in September 1934. ‘We shall also do our best to help in this service to the people.’ And the 
cooperation of the Church in this matter continued right through the war years, when the price of being Jewish 
was no longer dismissal from a government job and loss of livelihood, but deportation and outright physical 
destruction.” 
46
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 282. 
47
 Ibid., 264. 
48
 Ibid. 
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questions. Lest we forget, the Church had stood tall and humiliated Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, whose ferocious, oppressionist Kulturkampf (cultural struggle targeted at the 
Church) backfired, to the consolidation of the Catholic Center Party in Wilhemine Germany.49 
The Catholic Church—to which desperate Jews entreated for help in their greatest hours of 
need—was not weak. At the most fundamental level, its reticence had to do with its 
perception of Jews—that is, Catholic anti-Semitism.  
In fairness, the fact that Pius XII never explicitly deplored Nazi atrocities against Jews 
does not mean he legislated their destruction. To Catholic theologians at the time, Jews were 
redeemable by way of conversion. To Hilter—who hated Jews because of their genetic 
stock—such dispensations could not be made. Thus, Catholic and Hitlerian anti-Semitisms 
represented different projects. Yet this distinction mattered little, because hatreds fed on and 
gave impetus to one another, producing a dark symbiosis that only endangered Jews. As 
Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff was no “ordinary man.”50 Nor was he “Hitler’s 
willing executioner”51 or “Hitler’s pope.” Instead, Pacelli was Hitler’s fellow traveller.52 No 
admirer of the Führer, Pacelli nonetheless found reasons to ride the journey with his 
conscience intact.53 When push came to shove, Pacelli put in a word for Jewish converts to 
Catholicism to be spared, but never for Jews.54 At the heart of the dichotomy in his attitude 
was his very own antipathy towards Jews as Jews. 
                                                          
49
 Among its means of resistance, the Church threatened German Catholics who succumbed to Kulturkampf with 
ex-communication, which was never done to Nazis who participated in the Final Solution (other than Joseph 
Goebbels, who brought it on himself by marrying a Protestant). See James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword, 
(Mariner Books, 2001), 488. See also, John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 194. 
50
 Reference to “ordinary man” is adapted from Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 
101 and the Final Solution in Poland, (Harper Perennial, 1998) 
51
 Reference to “Hitler’s willing executioner” is adapted from Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioner, 
(Alfred Knopf, 1996). 
52
 The fellow traveler analogy was first used by Cornwell in Hitler’s Pope. But it is “Hilter’s Pope” rather than 
“Hitler’s fellow traveler” that has registered impression. 
53
 Postwar, in a meeting with delegates of the Supreme Council of the Arab People of Palestine, Pacelli averred 
that “on various occasions” he “condemned the fanatical anti-Semitism inflicted upon the Hebrew People.” 
Cornwell concludes that Pacelli revealed himself to be a hypocrite in the process. Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, 
Preface to the 2008 Edition, xxi. 
54
 Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows, 305. 
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Anti-Semitism—the historic curse of Christian Europe—was by no means a modern 
or strictly German phenomenon. It was an inheritance from medieval Christianity that 
preached that Jews consume the blood of Christian children and that Jews be held collectively 
sinful for the murder of Christ. The atavistic prejudice against Jews was pervasive in German 
and Eastern European societies. The Catholic Church was thus in a way a prisoner of its own 
teaching. Even though its brand of anti-Semitism was less genocidal than that of the Nazis, its 
thoroughgoing contempt for Judaism was hardly a motivating factor to criticize the diabolical 
clockwork that was Nazi eliminationist anti-Semitism. In considering the reasons for the 
silence of the Holy See, one must remember that two thousand years of Christian fulminating 
against the Jews conditioned Catholic perception of them. Lewy writes,  
One is inclined to conclude that the Pope and his advisers—influenced by the long 
tradition of moderate anti-Semitism so widely accepted in Vatican circles—did not 
view the plight of the Jews with a real sense of urgency and moral outrage. For this 
assertion no documentation is possible, but it is a conclusion difficult to avoid.55 
It was against this backdrop of racial revilement and religious demonization of Jews 
that the Jewish philosopher Edith Stein behoved herself to appeal to the Vatican for 
intervention back in 1933. Born into a Jewish family, and a convert to Catholicism, Stein was 
witness to the vehemence with which the Jewish people were being vilified by Hitler’s 
nascent regime. She noted instances of suicide, highlighting the plight in which Jews were 
made to suffer by the regime—“for years the leaders of National Socialism have been 
preaching hatred of the Jews.” 56  Stein’s writing showed an unswerving loyalty to the 
teachings of the Church and yet a critical attitude toward the Church’s silence during the 
early persecution of Jews.57 Her writing was testimony to the ordinances Nazism afflicted 
                                                          
55
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 305. 
56
 Edith Stein, Untitled letter addressed to His Holiness, in Hubert Wolf, Pope and Devil: The Vatican’s 
Archives and the Third Reich, trans. Kenneth Kronenberg. (Harvard University Press, 2010), 185. 
57
 While it was the passage of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 that marked the beginning of state-sponsored 
persecution, there had been dress rehearsals. On April 4th, 1933, barely having seized power, Hitler launched a 
nationwide assault on Jews. Even prior to that, the discourse of anti-Semitism had been key to Nazi electoral 
success. According to Daniel Goldhagen, author of the critically acclaimed international bestseller Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners, (Alfred Knopf, 1996), anti-Semitism was widespread among ordinary Germans, many of 
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upon the Jewish people—“robbing people of their livelihood, civil honor, and fatherland.”58 
The historical significance of this primary source is better illustrated by the response—or the 
lack of one—from Pius XI, who himself shared the anti-Semitic culture of his age. One can 
infer from Stein’s letters that despite no lack of grassroots Catholic opposition, lay Catholics 
opposed to anti-Semitism enjoyed no recognition from the papacy. Thus the bulk of 
accountability appeared to lie not in the moral numbness of practicing Catholics, but in the 
Vatican leadership, which did not regard Jews as people worthy of patronage. 
To be fair, it can be misleading to perceive the institutional Catholic Church as a 
monolithic organization devoid of diverse or dissenting voices. To be fair again, there were 
dissents of some kind from the German episcopate. These voices spoke with varying degrees 
of conviction and usually took the form of decrying the mistreatment of “the other” on a 
racial basis. German bishops who took the pulpits praised the Führer’s emphasis on racial 
purity, quibbling only that this goal be achieved “without immoral means.”59 Cardinal 
Faulhaber, a nobler figure, proclaimed in 1933 that “the defense and love of one’s own race 
should not lead to the hatred of other nations, and the loyalty to one’s own race does not 
supersede the obligations to the Church.”60 Echoing this sentiment years after was Archbishop 
Frings who, in the Christmas sermon of 1943, denounced the arbitrary racial murder of 
innocents. 61  Nevertheless, the empirical deficiencies of their methods of protest were 
excruciatingly obvious. For one, the bishops’ admonitions educated no one and made no 
difference to the Final Solution. 62 Nor did they provide usable information about the extent of 
mass murder. More to the point, critical vocabularies such as “Jew” and “non-Aryan” did not 
find entry to their scripts, the language of which was couched in generic terms, burdened with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
whom acquiesced to or collaborated in Nazi eliminationist anti-Semitism, making them “Hitler’s willing 
executioners.” 
58
 Wolf., Pope and Devil, 185. 
59
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 275. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid., 292. 
62
 Ibid. 
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stipulations, too mild in tone, and received scant public attention.63 With the exceptions of 
Bishop Preysing of Berlin, the German episcopate was generally apathetic to the endless 
racial persecutions of Jews, even in the wake of the proto-genocidal Kristallnacht (Night of 
Broken Glass) of November 1938.64 
In contrast to the craven and blinkered acquiescence of the Catholic clergy in 
Germany, it was ordinary conscience and human solidarity that inspired resistance. Provost 
Bernhard Lichtenberg of Berlin was one such figure who died resisting the Nazis. From his 
pulpit he said a daily prayer for Jews amid the regime’s increasingly strident anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, and was seized by the Gestapo in 1942 with his off-limits utterances of sympathy for 
Jews.65 But such acts of good Samaritanism were few and far between, which was why the 
Vatican took so long to find candidates for beautification in the context of the Final 
Solution.66 And while ordinary conscience did not always prevail, a collective display of 
human solidarity on the part of the German Aryans was enough to recover their Christian, 
non-Aryan spouses from the hands of the seemingly invincible Gestapo.67 We will never 
know what would have happened if the man in the Vatican palace displayed similar mettle in 
times of need. Suffice to say, the Church need not have spent decades covering up—or 
explicating in vain—how a religion of love and compassion, and an arbiter of universal moral 
truths, did so little in the face of consummate evil. 
In the final analysis, the Catholic Church responded to Nazi racial persecution of Jews 
with a diversity of attitudes that produced passivity and inaction at best and collaboration and 
                                                          
63
 Ibid., 291 & 292. 
64
 Kristallnacht has received treatment in most Church-Holocaust literature. See, for instance, Phayer, The 
Catholic Church and The Holocaust, 3. 
65
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 284 & 293. 
66
 Bernhard Lichtenberg of Berlin—and the Jewish philosopher Edith Stein, both of whom died nearing the end 
of the war—have been made into martyrs. Under the papacy of John Paul II, Stein was canonized and 
Lichtenberg elevated to saint status.  
67
 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, 289. In February 1943, the Gestapo arrested and detained 
6,000 non-Aryan Berliners, but their spouses protested in spontaneity for hours and, fearing the visibility of their 
demonstration, the Gestapo released the detainees. Lewy concludes, “Here was an example of what outraged 
conscience could achieve, even against Hitler’s terror apparatus.” 
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collusion at worst.68 Pius XII’s supine reaction to Nazi transgressions could have come down 
to his entrenched fear of communism, and his predilections for Germany might well have 
choked his tongue when he did speak. Yet, solely focusing on Pius XII removes the 
individual moral agency of cardinals, bishops and priests all over Catholic Europe, some of 
whom defended Jews in accordance to their conscience, many of whom did not. Owing to 
their anti-Semitism, their actions and inactions left dark memories on a persecuted people. 
Within the Eternal City, infected by the long and sorry tradition of consecrated anti-Semitism, 
Vatican bureaucrats spared little thought for the plight of the Jewish people. By the time the 
Second Vatican Council abolished in 1965 the deicide charge against all Jews of all time, too 
dear a price had been paid. Caught in between war, communism, and genocide, Vatican 
diplomacy was fraught with missteps. But so much more was amiss. The Concordat might 
have hamstrung the Church’s ability to interfere in Nazi racial policies, but this alliance was 
in the first place a reprehensible one, and while the Vatican might or might not have 
succeeded in aiding Jewish survival later on, it simply did not have the conscience to attempt 
anything like it. There were no doubt devout Catholics who risked or gave their lives to the 
cause of helping the Jews—exemplified by Edith Stein and Bernhard Lichtenberg—but as a 
group they were statistically small, as was the likelihood that they did so on holy orders from 
the Catholic Church. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68
 In accordance with its proposed chronology, this paper does not deal with the record of the Church after the 
Holocaust. But it was the Vatican—still under the papacy of Pius XII—that spirited Nazi war criminals at large 
to South America to escape prosecution. Thus, the complicity of the Catholic Church has another dimension, 
which readers can explore in Gerald Steinacher’s Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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